Abstract

The Royal Netherlands Navy (RNLN) was in the mid-1960s the third navy in size and operations within NATO Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT). Also the RNLN was one of the initiators of the Standing Naval Force Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT) and one of the few NATO navies entrusted to operate with US nuclear depth charges in wartime, and it would from the early 1970s onward participate with the US Navy and British Royal Navy in highly sensitive intelligence submarine operations. This article analyzes why the Dutch had such large naval ambitions in the first decades of the Cold War, and not withstanding earlier US and UK opposition, they managed to acquire a medium-sized and internationally respected professional balanced ocean fleet. Furthermore, it will be analyzed which factors enabled the Dutch Admiralty to realize its ambitions. Finally, this article will shed a light on the post-1970 circumstances that led to a less prominent position of the RNLN in ACLANT.

Introduction

In the mid-1960s, the Royal Netherlands Navy (RNLN) was in size and operations, the third navy within Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT). Its fleet comprised an aircraft carrier, cruisers, and over twenty destroyers and frigates, as well as other vessels. Dutch flag officers held high-ranking posts, like deputy commander Allied Command Eastern Atlantic (EASTLANT). Additionally, the RNLN was one of the initiators within ACLANT regarding an out-of-area strategy south of the Tropic of Cancer, it was one of the founders of the Standing Naval Force Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT), and it would, together with the US and Royal Navy, from 1973 onward participate in highly sensitive submarine intelligence operations.

This article examines why the RNLN had such large ambitions during the first decades of ACLANT (founded in 1952) and was not without influence in the maritime component of the Atlantic defense and security organization. Furthermore, it will analyze what circumstances enabled this situation. Finally, this article will examine what reasons led to the declining position of the RNLN’s influence in ACLANT after 1970.

 

Dutch naval ambitions

It was the Dutch Admiralty that, after the loss of the colony of Indonesia in December 1949, refused to confine the RNLN to a single role of Mine Counter Measure (MCM) tasks in the North Sea. In no way did it want to see its fleet transformed into “a small and confined continental navy,” as the Secretary of the Navy stated. ¹ Therefore, in the first decades after 1950 the Dutch navy stuck to a doctrine of worldwide reach as well as a sizable, for this purpose adjustable balanced fleet, consisting of relatively large surface vessels and submarines, Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA), MCM vessels and marines.² This was partly in line with earlier viewpoints of the Dutch on the structure of their naval forces.

In the first half of the twentieth century, the larger part of the RNLN was stationed in the Netherlands East Indies, current Indonesia. On the eve of both world wars, this auxiliary squadron had been relatively large in size. In 1914 it comprised a dozen light and heavy cruisers, and in 1939 it included four light cruisers, twenty-five destroyers and submarines, over twenty minesweepers/layers and more than sixty amphibious MPA. In both 1914 and 1939 the Dutch government, due to the threatening international security situation (read: the rise of Japan), strove for a fleet expansion with heavy ships; respectively a squadron of dreadnoughts and battle cruisers. Given the outbreak of World War I in August 1914 and invasion of the Netherlands by Nazi Germany in May 1940, both the dreadnought and battle cruiser squadrons never materialized.³

The Dutch navy therefore envisioned in 1945 that given the concept of sea power (and national influence), it had to strive for a flexible and balanced fleet that could fulfill a mixture of tasks.’

After 1945 the RNLN was therefore no stranger to ambitious fleet plans. Furthermore it was influenced by negative experiences during the war. Throughout World War II it had no or little influence on Allied maritime strategy and operations, despite having a relatively large merchant fleet (5th largest in the world) and participating in fighting operations in the major theaters until the war’s end with over a dozen men-of-war and numerous minesweepers. The Dutch navy therefore envisioned in 1945 that given the concept of sea power (and national influence), it had to strive for a flexible and balanced fleet that could fulfill a combination of tasks. After scaling back a far-too-ambitious fleet plan (November 1945) of three to four naval squadrons with aircraft carriers, numerous cruisers, dozens of destroyers and amphibious task forces, the admiralty in the years hereafter exploited the political room for maneuver provided by its huge national prestige.⁴

This prestige came from the fact that, in contrast to the army, the RNLN, although suffering heavy losses, never surrendered in World War II, fought bravely and after 1945 successfully associated itself with the national maritime heritage of great naval victories in the 17th century by (inter)nationally renowned admirals like Michiel de Ruyter and Maarten and Cornelis Tromp.⁵ This proved to be effective. In the mid-1960s, at its height, the Dutch navy comprised an aircraft carrier, two light cruisers, twenty-four destroyers and frigates, seven submarines, one tanker/auxiliary, seventy-two minesweepers, 130 aircraft/helicopters (eight squadrons) and 3,100 marines.⁶

National enablers to fulfill Dutch naval ambitions

After World War II and the traumatic loss of the important colony of Indonesia in 1949 (partly attributed to American pressure), the Dutch public and its parliamentary representatives were in no mood to forsake “their” maritime heritage and resurging navy. Further on, in political discussions in the 1950s, the RNLN made use of the weak position of the disorganized army, which had to reinvent itself after an inglorious retreat out of Indonesia—a lost decolonization war in which the fleet, in contrast to the army, had barely been involved. Furthermore, a series of weak secretaries of the army, who again and again had to defend shaky budget plans, reinforced the public and political image of an efficient Dutch navy, that cleverly had coordinated matters with the Department of Finance in advance, and produced clear and credible spending plans.⁷ Particularly the earlier mentioned national maritime pride, as well as a relatively large workforce depending on the shipbuilding and (naval) weapon systems industry until the late 1970s, contributed to a long-standing favorable view of parliament and the Dutch taxpayer towards the RNLN and its ambitions.⁸ These ambitions were framed first and foremost in terms of national interest, such as protecting the Dutch merchant navy and remaining overseas territories (Caribbean and West New Guinea). NATO obligations like MCM were seen as of more secondary importance. Moreover, at that moment the Dutch Naval Staff was rather scornful of the North Atlantic pact because it considered the treaty organization to be no more than a temporary alliance (until 1974), while Dutch overseas interests were permanent. Finally, given that the RNLN had its own naval officer-turned Minister of the Navy until 1971, besides the fact that former naval captain and war hero Piet de Jong became Secretary of Defense (1963–1967) and later Prime Minister (1967–1971), and long serving Minister of Foreign Affairs Joseph Luns (1952–1971) was a zealous navalist, played into the hands of the Dutch admiralty.⁹

International factors that enabled far-reaching Dutch naval ambitions

International reputation

In 1949 NATO’s military command stressed that the Dutch should give priority to the build-up of their land and air forces. The state of the Allied land defense was poor in the face of an overwhelming Red Army. Given the Soviet weakness at sea at that moment, an attack by Moscow could only be expected over land and through the air. It thus seemed reasonable to ask the Netherlands to limit its maritime efforts and to leave the defense of the Atlantic to the larger Anglo-Saxon partners. Until early 1950, the US Navy and Royal Navy also had their reasons to be less enthusiastic of a Dutch Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) role in the North Atlantic. Both navies were struggling for budgets in a period that lawmakers favored the Army and especially the Air Force over maritime assets like carriers and cruisers. Given this situation, both Anglo-Saxon navies did not welcome similar Dutch vessels in the High Atlantic, which would make the necessity of own units even less plausible.¹⁰

The Korean War (1950–53), with large-scale and, above all, necessary operations of aircraft carriers, cruisers and destroyers, proved, however, that navies still were of a huge value in armed conflicts. Growing British but above all US naval budgets hereafter, meant that the aforementioned fear of Dutch “competition” on the high seas no longer applied. Furthermore, a broad NATO scare over a supposed “submarine gap” of hundreds of such Soviet vessels, as well as the good impression that RNLN destroyers made in a Commonwealth squadron in the Korean waters with escort duties and naval gunfire support, made that both Anglo-Saxon navies in 1951-52 favored a Dutch task (although not a primary one) in defending the supposed imminently threatened Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) in the ACLANT area. With hindsight, the British Admiralty also praised World War II operations of the RNLN under the command of the Royal Navy.¹¹ Besides that, US Navy and Royal Navy flag officers had a growing confidence in the Dutch because of their good achievements with destroyers and submarines in Western Union (WU) and NATO maritime exercises in the early 1950s. Facts that further weighed in here, were that the Dutch delivered high level Commanding (Flag) Officers, like during the May 1950 WU Exercise Activity.¹², as well as that they stationed successfully several own Fleet Air Arm squadrons on UK aircraft carriers in large scale ACLANT exercises such as Mainbrace in 1952 and Mariner in 1953. The Royal Navy, which was short on own board planes, was more than happy with these embarked RNLN assets.¹³ Soon thereafter a confident RNLN successfully initiated a (favorable for the Netherlands) separate British NATO Commander-in-Chief Channel (CINCHAN) with a Dutch deputy, whose task it was to coordinate all Channel convoys.

As British naval attachés stationed in The Hague noted respectively in 1955 and 1959 in internal memos to London: “The general efficiency and morale of the Royal Netherlands navy is of a high order.”’

With this initiative the RNLN blocked an earlier British idea to bring all the Allied escort vessels in the North Sea under the so-called Nore Command, which was subordinate to the British national Commander-in-Chief Home Fleet. The French, still full members of the alliance and with larger naval assets than the Dutch, should have objected to the British proposal in the first place, but they tried to barter their influence in Channel Command for a leading position in the future Iberian Atlantic Area Command (IBERLANT). Notwithstanding the Dutch move, not only did the British show willingness to listen to their junior partner, but the Royal Navy hereafter reported also, without exception, very favorably on the RNLN conduct during bilateral and multinational NATO (ASW) exercises in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean in the 1950s and early 1960s.¹⁴ As British naval attachés stationed in The Hague noted respectively in 1955 and 1959 in internal memos to London: “The general efficiency and morale of the Royal Netherlands navy is of a high order.” As well the Dutch made “intelligent  and economic use of their ships, aircraft and equipment and should make an effective and worthwhile contribution to the NATO forces.”¹⁵

MDAP

Given the above-mentioned international reputation with the most important Anglo-Saxon navies in NATO, the US was inclined to give the Netherlands more maritime military (financial) help than it had earlier foreseen. Although the Dutch invested from the late 1940s onward in capital ships like the aircraft carrier HNLMS Karel Doorman, cruisers, and destroyers and submarines, the fleet became even larger and more balanced thanks to American help as a result of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP). Most of the vessels of the large MCM fleet were paid for by Washington or given on loan. The same applied to a dozen small frigates, two Guppy submarines, Sikorsky S-34 and S-55 helicopters, Grumman S-2 Trackers and several Lockheed PV-2C Harpoon, later P-2 Neptune MPA, which were also given on loan by the Americans.¹⁶

French withdrawal, STANAVFORLANT, out-of-area and Signals Intel-ligence (SIGINT) operations

The French president Charles de Gaulle, not amused after Washington planned a NATO Multilateral nuclear armed naval force (MLF) to counter France’s ideas of having its own ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), and the fact that it was foreseen that an American and not a French admiral would lead the new naval command IBERLANT, decided in June 1963 to pull the assets of La Marine nationale out of the ACLANT command. In 1966, France would even withdraw its entire military out of NATO. The consequence was that the RNLN in size and operations became the second navy within EASTLANT and the third navy within the ACLANT area, after the US Navy and the Royal Navy. As a further result, the Dutch delivered thereafter the de facto deputy commander EASTLANT for the Headquarters in Northwood. Since the British Commander-in-Chief ACLANT also acted as Commander-in-Chief Fleet (CINCFLEET) and focused on his duties for the British navy, he relegated most of his NATO/ACLANT tasks to his Dutch deputy. The latter thus in practice ran the daily routine matters in EASTLANT. Finally, as a consequence of the unavailability of French harbors to NATO, the ports of Rotterdam and Flushing became the major supply ports of US and Canadian reinforcements to Europe.¹⁷

Given their status as a “traditional maritime power,” but more importantly to show loyalty to Washington (especially in years where the RNLN was seeking US knowledge for hoped-for own SSNs), and to prevent a possible West German nuclear solo effort, the Dutch participated in an experiment of a mixed-manning ship in 1964–1965, the USS Claude V. Ricketts for the never-realized NATO MLF. ¹⁸ The Netherlands was in 1965 a far more enthusiastic participant in the temporary multinational Allied naval task force Matchmaker, which consisted further of vessels from the US, the United Kingdom and Canada. When in December 1967 Supreme Allied Command Atlantic (SACLANT) officially set up the STANAVFORLANT, the Dutch were again among the first to participate in this task force together with the three Anglo-Saxon navies.¹⁹ Comfortable with this elite position, the RNLN thereafter blocked a structural participation of the growing West German Bundesmarine in this maritime NATO squadron until 1972.²⁰

Since the Dutch navy felt no appetite after the loss of West New Guinea in 1962 to slip down the scale of maritime nations with “just” ASW tasks in defending Allied SLOCs in the North Atlantic and MCM in the Channel and the North Sea, it was most interested and involved in NATO discussions on out-of-area operations from the mid-1960s onward. These discussions were the result of growing Soviet presence on the high seas under the influence of Soviet admiral Sergey Gorshkov. Wherever possible, the RNLN (often alongside the Royal Navy) supported US ideas in high-level talks of balancing Soviet naval presence south of the Tropic of Cancer (the NATO southern maritime border of the treaty area) with its own task forces. In this regard the Dutch Admiralty sailed group deployments around the world in 1970, 1973 and 1979, and, without consulting its national political masters, initiated hosting STANAVFORLANT in Curaçao in 1971.²¹ This main island of the Netherlands Antilles, north of Venezuela, harbored the only Dutch naval base outside of Europe.

Finally, by integrating in 1972–1973 parts of its Submarine Service and Marine Corps with that of the Royal Navy, the RNLN was able to display its abilities in the defense of the threatened NATO Northern flank. Thereafter a Dutch submarine was structurally stationed in Faslane, and the so-called UK/NL Amphibious Force, consisting of British and Dutch marine contingents, trained on regular basis in Scotland, Wales and Norway.²² It could also provide, above the earlier reported vessel in Faslane, 2-3 times annually its own naval assets for combined US-UK-NL intelligence missions (SIGINT, Acoustical Intelligence, Photo Intelligence) within the British Third Submarine Squadron, code name Cluster Canvas. For years these surveillance patrols were carried out in the North Atlantic and the Mediterranean, to wit: in the GIUK-gap near the Faroe Islands and Shetlands, the Norwegian Sea, as well as in Soviet anchorage grounds near the coast of Tunisia and Libya, in a period that the US was struggling with own assets and budget during the Vietnam War.²³

‘Although in the mid-1960s, the RNLN was at its height concerning its size and influence, nationally on policy makers and internationally in ACLANT, it soon struggled to maintain this position.’

Diminishing Dutch naval assets, influence and continuing ambitions

Although in the mid-1960s, the RNLN was at its height concerning its size and influence, nationally on policy makers and internationally in ACLANT, it soon struggled to maintain this position. Several reasons were responsible for this. Nationally, the shipyard industry and the merchant navy were in decline because of a price war with East Asia that the Dutch gradually lost.²⁴ This had, among others, as a consequence that Dutch society (which in this phase had lesser relations with the nautical world) was less maritime minded and more focused on subjects like European integration. In addition, society and influential (center) left political parties assessed Defense and NATO more critically. Under these circumstances, the Ministry of Defense and therefore the RNLN faced budget cuts during the international economic crisis of the early 1970s. These factors, combined with growing costs of new weapon systems (missiles etc.) and computerization, rising salaries, as well as the end of the US MDAP, forced the RNLN after the sale of the carrier and cruisers (1968–1976) to concentrate on a balanced fleet of  “only” twenty (large) frigates, a smaller fleet of submarines, small frigates and MCM vessels, fewer (though a standardized type—Westland Lynx) helicopters, and a reduced Marine Corps.²⁵ Only the number of MPAs grew. After the sale of the aircraft carrier Karel Doorman in 1968, whose main task had been ASW, the two Fleet Air Arm squadrons with a total of seventeen Lockheed SP-2H Neptunes, were supplemented with nine Bréguet Atlantics. Both types of RNLN MPAs were hereafter at intervals stationed at Forward Operating Bases in Great Britain (Machrihanish, Scotland, and St. Mawgan, Cornwall). In times of war these Dutch squadrons would have been armed with (US) nuclear depth charges; a task entrusted to only a few NATO partners. Although they had a longer flight range than the aging Neptunes, the navy was unhappy with the new planes. It had been in favor of the American Lockheed P-3B Orion, but the Dutch government decided that a more European approach, and the fact that national aircraft manufacturer Fokker produced parts of this type of MPA, should prevail.²⁶

Internationally, the fact that the Royal Navy was in decline meant that the influence of the RNLN within ACLANT diminished as well because of its close relationship with the British. Also, the Bundesmarine grew in substance, had larger weapon platforms, and changed its range and doctrine. It was no longer just a Küstenmarine; it operated in the North Atlantic/Norwegian Sea as well and it participated among others in STANAVFORLANT.²⁷ By this time in size and operations, it slowly but steadily surpassed the Dutch in being the second navy in EASTLANT.

 

 

Nevertheless, the Admiralty in the Netherlands still had huge ambitions and tried in these years to maintain a balanced fleet. For the Dutch navy, it was of great help during these challenging circumstances that the NATO launched in 1967 the strategy of Flexible Response, by which the treaty organization left the Warsaw Pact in doubt whether the West would react with massive nuclear retaliation on an enemy attack or with conventional means. As a result of this new strategic approach, the alliance had to invest more in conventional units. As mentioned, apart from selling the capital, but outdated, vessels like the cruisers, the Dutch modernized their naval assets from the late 1960s onward. Although plans to build SSNs and helicopter carriers had to be cancelled, a new balanced fleet was realized in the end.²⁸ Helped by strong criticism of the Alliance (especially the Americans and the British) from the Dutch government, who in 1973–1974 planned far-reaching budget cuts on defense, the RNLN convinced in these years small majorities in parliament of the necessity of these naval investments. It referred in this matter gratefully to (new) conventional NATO tasks that derived from the threat of a growing and modernizing Soviet Navy, like the defense of the Northern Flank (Norway), as well as enhanced and extended ASW patrols in the GIUK gap, operating from bases in the United Kingdom.²⁹ Also, the Admiralty in the Netherlands pointed to increased deployments in the Caribbean. RNLN frigates participated after US requests more regularly in yearly regional multinational fleet exercises like UNITAS, in which the Dutch showed their flag from 1979 onwards.³⁰ Furthermore the RNLN found allies in the national Departments of Economic and Social Affairs with its fleet renewal plans. They applauded and partly funded them, because they feared mass layoffs in the national shipbuilding industry, which was being squeezed by foreign competition.³¹

Conclusion

Earlier worldwide colonial responsibilities, World War II frustrations in having no say over the national (merchant) fleet, skillful representation in national politics, international standing and maritime jingoism of many politicians and voters, meant that the RNLN could, for decades, live up to its huge ambitions. The Dutch navy could remain a medium-sized navy within NATO for a long time, with capabilities ranging between those of the larger navies such as the British, and allies like Denmark, Portugal and even West Germany.³² The ability to demonstrate, both nationally and internationally, that the RNLN was a flexible and professional organization that could be employed on the high seas and worldwide in technically difficult operations like ASW, upheld the prestige of the navy, gave it influence in parliament and with the greater Anglo-Saxon navies in ACLANT, and proved in both theaters useful at times when it was under threat. A large maritime heritage, wharf industries, and a relatively large amount of seapower, were other factors that influenced Dutch government policy and Anglo-Saxon partners, which enabled the RNLN to fulfill most of its ambitions.

Interestingly, the RNLN was, contrary to the other Dutch armed forces after 1945, far more capability-driven, not a threat-driven branch. NATO command stressed in 1949–1950 that the Netherlands should focus on the army and air force, given the larger threat of the Red Army in Europe and the Anglo-Saxon superiority over the Soviets at sea at that moment. Nevertheless, the Dutch public backed the buildup in those years of a relatively large and balanced blue-water navy that concentrated on national, rather than NATO, tasks. After the major part of its national overseas responsibilities fell away with the loss of West New Guinea in 1962 and a diminishing merchant navy fleet from 1965 onwards, the Dutch admiralty, under increasing political and financial pressure, searched for new responsibilities that enabled it to maintain a relatively balanced navy and herewith (inter)national influence.³³ NATO/ACLANT was in this period the main enabler to the admiralty’s ambitions: ASW in the North Atlantic, and, from 1970 onward, the defense of Norway with, among others, marines (UK/NL Amphibious Force) and out-of-area group deployments. The RNLN therefore used its prestige and influence with the British and Americans to acquire or threshold these (new) tasks, and to convince its own government and parliament of the necessity of its reduced but still relatively large assets. In the end it was these factors that led to the situation that, over all these years, the RNLN punched above its weight.

Notes

1. C. Homan and R. T. B. Visser, “‘Nederland heeft geen area, de hele vrije zee is ons gebied.’ Een interview met eskadercommandant schout-bij-nacht J. D. W. van Renesse,” Marineblad 95, no. 9 (1985): 384–393; Anselm van der Peet, Out-of-area: De Koninklijke Marine en multinationale vlootoperaties 1945–2001 (Franeker: Van Wijnen, 2016), 124, 131, 129, 186; D. C. L. Schoonoord, Pugno Pro Patria: De Koninklijke Marine tijdens de Koude Oorlog (Franeker: Van Wijnen, 2012), 133.[↩]
2. Van der Peet, Out-of-area, 125, 163–66, 172–80.[↩]
3. Petra Groen et al., Krijgsgeweld en kolonie. Opkomst en ondergang van Nederland als koloniale mogendheid 1816–2010 (Amsterdam: Boom, 2021), 155–257; Jan Hoffenaar, “De krijgsmacht in historisch perspectief” in E. R. Muller, ed., Krijgsmacht: Studies over de organisatie en het optreden (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer, 2004), 37; G. Teitler, De strijd om de slagkruisers 1938–1940 (Amsterdam: Bataafsche Leeuw, 1984). [↩]
4. S. G. Nooteboom, Deugdelijke Schepen. Marnescheepsbouw 1945–1995 (Zaltbommel: Europese Bibliotheek, 2001), 14–16; Schoonoord, Pugno Pro Patria, 24–28.[↩]
5. Jan Willem L. Brouwer, “Dutch Naval Policy in the Cold War Period,” in Jaap Bruijn, ed., Strategy and Response in the Twentieth Century Maritime World: Papers Presented to the Fourth British-Dutch Maritime History Conference (Amsterdam: Bataafsche Leeuw, 2001), 43–44.[↩]
6.  Jaarboek van de Koninklijke Marine 1964 (’s-Gravenhage, Staatsuitgeverij: 1965) 32, 282–323.[↩]
7. . W. L. Brouwer, “Staatssecretaris H. C. W. Moorman en de toekomst van de marine 1949–1951.” Marineblad 101, no. 2 (1991), 70–77. [↩]
8. Robert Gardiner, ed., Navies in the Nuclear Age: Warships Since 1945 (London: Conway Maritime Press, 1993) 152; Van der Peet, Out-of-area, 94, 157, 328, 476.[↩]
9. Brouwer, “Dutch Naval Policy,” 43-48. Joseph Luns later became the longest-serving Secretary General of NATO (1971–1984).[↩]
10. Van der Peet, Out-of-area, 49-50, 252.[↩]
11. Van der Peet, Out-of-area, 252-253; Anselm van der Peet, “The Royal Netherlands Navy in the Korean War 1950–1953: A Case Study on Worldwide Ambitions, and International as Well as National Prestige” in P. Crociani, A. Bifolchi, eds., Joint and Combined Operations in the History of Warfare (ICMH ACTA, 39th Congress, Turin, 1–6 September 2013) (Rome: Ministero della Difesa, 2013), 533–539; Anselm van der Peet, “The threat that never was? Mispercepties over de dreiging van Sovjetonderzeeboten voor westerse zeelijnen, 1945–1980,” Militaire Spectator 193, no. 5 (2024) 330–349, 334–335.[↩]
12. Schoonoord, Pugno Pro Patria, 50.[↩]
13. Eric Grove, Vanguard to Trident. British Naval Policy since World War Two (Annapolis, MA: Naval Institute Press, 1987), 44, 56-57, 73; Anselm van der Peet, “Mainbrace september 1952. ‘Moeder’ van alle grote maritieme oefeningen op de NAVO-noordflank,” Marineblad 132, No. 6 (2022), 28–35.[↩]
14. Netherlands Institute for Military History, Admiralty Board, Minutes, (The Hague, 14 January 1958); Brouwer, “Dutch Naval Policy,” 48–49.[↩]
15. Cited in: Brouwer, “Dutch Naval Policy,” 48.[↩]
16. C. M. Megens, American Aid to NATO Allies in the 1950’s: the Dutch Case (Amsterdam: Thesis Publishers, 1994). Publisher Thesis apparently does not exist anymore but references to it are made elsewhere too. See for example: https://research.rug.nl/en/publications/american-aid-to-nato-allies-in-the-1950s-the-dutch-case[↩]
17. P. B. R. de Geus, Staatsbelang en krijgsmacht: De Nederlandse defensie tijdens de Koude Oorlog (Den Haag: SDU, 1998), 96–97, 104; Joel J. Sokolsky, Seapower in the Nuclear Age: The United States Navy and NATO, 1949–80 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991) 50–51; Captain Niek Delfos, RNLN (ret.), former aide-de-camp of Secretary of Defense P. J. S. de Jong and Vice Admiral RNLN J. B. J. M. Maas, Interview with author, 18 January 2016.[↩]
18. Schoonoord, Pugno Pro Patria, 143–150. The RNLN participated moderately enthusiastically in the USS Claude V. Rickets project (the Admiralty saw no real military advantages in it), but the experiment resulted in US goodwill towards the Dutch and in the end Dutch membership of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group.[↩]
19. Marc A. van Alphen, Anita M. C. van Dissel, Adri P. van Vliet, eds., Chronicle of the Royal Netherlands Navy: Five Hundred Years of Dutch Maritime History (Amsterdam: De Bataafsche Leeuw, 2016), 74, 443.[↩]
20. Van der Peet, Out-of-area, 157. See for West German naval ambitions regarding Matchmaker and STANAVFORLANT: Werner Rahn, ed., Deutsche Marinen im Wandel: Vom Symbol nationaler Einheit zum Instrument internationaler Sicherheit, Beiträge zur Militärgeschichte, Band 63 (Oldenbourg: De Gruyter 2004), 585.[↩]
21. Anselm van der Peet, “Wereldwijde ambities en Buitenlandse Zaken. Een gevalstudie over gevoelige Nederlandse marinemanoeuvres in de Koude Oorlog.” Marineblad 124, no. 2 (2014), 23–25; Van der Peet, Out-of-area, 59–89, 147–158, 171–180.[↩]
22. H. Mallant, “Het Korps Mariniers en de Noordflank” in G. Teitler and C. Homan, eds., Het Korps Mariniers 1942-heden, (Amsterdam/Dieren, De Bataafsche Leeuw: 1985), 67–75; Schoonoord, Pugno Pro Patria, 185, 198; Van der Peet, Out-of-Area, 153.[↩]
23. Robin Snouck Hurgronje et al., Klaar voor onder water: Honderd jaar Nederlandse onderzeeboten (Zaltbommel/Den Helder: Aprilis & Marinemuseum, 2006), 64–87; Schoonoord, Pugno Pro Patria, 185–205. See also Jaime Karreman, In het diepste geheim: Spionage-operaties van Nederlandse onderzeeboten van 1968 tot 1991 (Amsterdam: Marineschepen.nl, 2017).[↩]
24. Anne H. Flierman, “Mayday, or how to attract attention. The Dutch merchant navy and politics 1960–1995” in Jaap Bruijn, ed., Strategy and Response in the Twentieth Century Maritime World. Papers presented to the Fourth British-Dutch Maritime History Conference (Amsterdam: Bataafsche Leeuw, 2001),  62–76; Cees de Voogd, “Dutch Government Policy and the Decline of Shipbuilding in the Netherlands” in Jaap Bruijn, ed., Strategy and Response in the Twentieth Century: Maritime World. Papers Presented to the Fourth British-Dutch Maritime History Conference (Amsterdam: Bataafsche Leeuw, 2001), 100–119.[↩]
25. Schoonoord, Pugno Pro Patria, 162–177, 188–192, 198–205.[↩]
26. N. Geldhof, 70 jaar Marineluchtvaartdienst (Leeuwarden, Eisma B. V.: 1987), 162–163, 209, 216–217; Schoonoord, Pugno Pro Patria, 143–144, 178–179. Although officially an RAF station, from the mid-1960s onwards Machrihanish came under the command of US Navy Commander in Chief, Atlantic Command (CINCLANT). At RAF St. Mawgan from 1969 onward British Hawker-Siddeley Nimrod MPAs were stationed. Also US Navy facilities could been found at this Cornish airbase. Sources: S. Duke, US Defence Bases in the United Kingdom: A Matter for Joint Decision? (New York: MacMillan, 1986), 148–149; https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/nuclear-vault/2021-01-15/us-nuclear-weapons-netherlands-first-appraisal Website accessed 14 January 2025[↩]
27. Johannes Berthold Sander-Nagashima, Die Bundesmarine 1950 bis 1972: Konzeption und Aufbau (München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2006), 383–468.[↩]
28. Anselm van der Peet, “Back to the future? Discussies bij defensienota’s en vlootplannen 1962–1970 als inspiratiebron voor hedendaags maritiem-strategisch debat over een toekomstbestendige KM,” Marineblad 132, no. 2 (2023), 22–29, 24–29.[↩]
29. Hoffenaar, “De Nederlandse krijgsmacht in historisch perspectief,” 39; J. Hoffenaar, “De baby is er! De Defensienota 1974 en het gevecht over de toekomst van de krijgsmacht,” in Jan Hoffenaar, Jan van der Meulen, Rolf de Winter, eds., Confrontatie en ontspanning: Maatschappij en krijgsmacht in de Koude Oorlog 1966–1989 (Den Haag: SDU, 2004), 43–44, 47, 50–51. See for the Dutch SSNs and helicopter carrier plans: Van der Peet, Out-of-area, 58; A. J. van der Peet, “The French connection: Manoeuvres rondom een Frans-Nederlands nucleair onderzeebootproject,” Marineblad 115, no. 5 (2005), 192–197; Van der Peet, “Back to the future?,” 24–29; G. Teitler, “Een Nederlandse Nautilus?,” Marineblad 90, no. 10 (1980), 410–418.[↩]
30. Jaarboek van de Koninklijke Marine 1979 (’s-Gravenhage: Staatsuitgeverij, 1982) 223. The Dutch navy also participated from the late 1970s onward in bilateral RADEX naval exercises with the U.S. Navy in the Caribbean area. Source: Van der Peet, Out-of-area, 88-89.[↩]
31. Anselm van der Peet, “Sailing the Stormy Seas of Naval Shipbuilding. Dutch fleet renewal against all odds, 1968–1990,” (paper presentation, McMullen Naval History Symposium, Annapolis, MD, 24 September 2021).[↩]
32. Ko Colijn and Paul Rusman, Het Nederlandse Wapenexportbeleid 1963–1988 (’s-Gravenhage: Nijgh & Van Ditmar Universitair, 1989), 519.[↩]
33. Schoonoord, Pugno Pro Patria, 64–67.[↩]