Just when it starts to seem that after more than a hundred years there is nothing new to say about Alfred Thayer Mahan’s writings, along comes The Neptune Factor: Alfred Thayer Mahan and the Concept of $ea Power by Nicholas A. Lambert. In this newly published and detailed biography, Lambert provides a wholistic view that greatly expands the canon.

Lambert has already established a reputation for detailed and thoroughly researched military history. Some of his best work has been characterized as revisionist, as he relies upon often newly uncovered or misunderstood archival records and personal correspondence to open areas of inquiry that have hitherto been underexamined. His book on England’s consideration of economic warfare against Imperial Germany at the beginning of the First World War and his argument that domestic economic pressures had more to do with the fateful decisions that led to the disaster at Gallipoli force readers to open their apertures. The Neptune Factor: Alfred Thayer Mahan and the Concept of $ea Power is another such book.

Most discussions of Mahan focus on the argument that his writings led to the growth of the U.S. Navy and its approach to naval warfighting for the 20th century. Unfortunately, most commentators either misunderstood what he was saying or did not address enough of what he wrote to demonstrate the breadth and nuances of his argument. This has led to a misapplication of Mahan’s theories on the broader concept of sea power and often a simplistic “who’s right: Mahan or Corbett?” debate.

Lambert corrects these misperceptions. He argues that Mahan was not writing merely to support the Navy and the military application of naval power. Rather, if one moves beyond The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660-1783 to consider Mahan’s other two treatises on sea power and the rest of his writings, it is clear that Mahan saw broader socioeconomic interests at play. As Lambert summarizes, “If there was a single constant running through his [Mahan’s] whole intellectual career, it was not the need for a battle fleet or command of the sea, as is often thought, but rather the need to understand the economic environment in which nations employ sea power” (p. 311).

Lambert covers Mahan’s life through three phases: the first leading through his early career up to the publishing of the first book in the Influence trilogy in 1890, the second ending with America’s war with Spain and its aftermath in 1899, and the third from 1899 through Mahan’s death in 1914. Lambert demonstrates how Mahan revised his approach to sea power throughout these periods. More important, he illustrates how Mahan’s writing evolved from its focus on sea power to encompass the broader geopolitical issues of expansionism and of a globalized economic system. Throughout, Lambert notes that Mahan’s ability to see and effectively communicate the importance of economics and diplomacy was unique. Mahan wrote as no other single individual was able, arguing for the advancement of national interests using all instruments of statecraft. Lambert also shows Mahan’s commitment, given the overall strategic context of the nation, that “the navy – and if I [Mahan] may even say the country – needs a voice to speak constantly of our external matters generally” (p. 170).

In The Neptune Factor, Lambert reflects the approach made in his earlier work on the Royal Navy’s attempt to support a blockade of Imperial Germany during the First World War. He relies extensively on archival material, personal writings, and Mahan’s correspondence with contemporaries to provide a narrative that expands the reader’s understanding and appreciation. The result is a resource of exceptional use to those of us studying Mahan and his period, and Lambert’s writing is as clear and readable as any lay reader could ask.

In the final two chapters, Lambert recasts Mahan’s legacy, not simply in his historical writing and geo-economic analysis of the time, but in a manner that, as President Theodore Roosevelt stated, “those among us who occupy high legislative or administrative positions, would study the history of our nation, not merely for the purpose of national self-gratification, but . . . to learn the lessons that history teaches.” Lambert challenges the reliance of other Mahan commentators on the writings of Samuel Huntington, which provided a framework for analysis that may have been apt for the early Cold War but does not fit the current strategic environment. Lambert similarly criticizes the contribution to compendia on strategy, asserting that failures to put Mahan’s writings in the broader context of all his writings failed thousands of scholars and practitioners who came away with limited, even simplistic, understandings. Lambert demonstrates that only by understanding all of Mahan’s works may lessons with applicability to the uncertain world of the 21st century be drawn.

Mahan’s understanding of geo-economic factors as well as his unique ability to write in such a way that his message was understood by the public as well as the military and political elite is a necessary perspective. Lambert’s work in researching and writing The Neptune Factor: Alfred Thayer Mahan and the Concept of $ea Power has provided us with a book that should be in the library of every military, diplomatic, and strategic scholar.